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Recent trends in supercomputing, shared cloud computing, and “big data” applications
are placing ever-greater demands on computing systems and their memories. Such applica-
tions can readily saturate memory bandwidth, and often operate on a working set which ex-
ceeds the capacity of modern DRAM packages. Unfortunately, this demand is not matched
by DRAM technology development. As Moore’s Law slows and Dennard Scaling stops,
further density improvements in DRAM and the underlying semiconductor devices are dif-
ficult [1]. In anticipation of this limitation, researchers have pursued emerging memory
technologies that promise higher density than conventional DRAM devices. One such tech-
nology in phase-change memory (PCM) is especially desirable due to its increased density
relative to DRAM. However, this nascent memory has outstanding challenges to overcome
before it is viable as a DRAM replacement. PCM devices have limited write endurance,
and can consume more energy than their DRAM counterparts, necessitating careful control
of how and how often they are written. A second challenge is the non-volatile nature of
PCM devices; many applications rely on the volatility of DRAM to protect security critical
applications and operating system address space between accesses and power cycles. An
obvious solution is to encrypt the memory, but the effective randomization of data is at odds
with techniques which reduce writes to the underlying memory. This body of work presents
three contributions for addressing all challenges simultaneously under the assumption that
encryption is required. Using an encryption and encoding technique called CASTLE &
TOWERs, PCM can be employed as main memory with up to 30× improvement in device
lifetime while opportunistically reducing dynamic energy. A second technique called MACE
marries encoding and traditional error-correction schemes providing up to 2.6× improvement
in device lifetime alongside a whole-lifetime energy evaluation framework to guide system
design. Finally, an architecture called WINDU is presented which supports the application
of encoding for an emerging encryption standard with an eye on energy efficiency. Together,
iv
these techniques advance the state-of-the-art, and offer a significant step toward the adoption
of PCM as a main memory.
v
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1.0 Introduction
The demands of “big-data” applications and the limitations of DRAM scaling necessi-
tate the development of denser emerging memory technologies to meet the needs of modern
computational workloads [2, 1, 3]. The first devices employing PCM are already coming
to market, signaling industry adoption and improving process development for large-scale
fabrication. PCM is the most promising replacement for DRAM, given its recent commer-
cial debut in a tiered memory behind conventional DRAM in the Intel Optane Intel Optane
Persistent Memory [4]. This combination of DRAM and PCM in the form of 3D X-Point
memory [5] bridges the gap between a purely PCM and a purely DRAM main memory to
benefit database, big-data analytics, content delivery, and virtual machine infrastructure ap-
plications. In addition to presenting a larger working set to such applications, the addition
of non-volatile memory in tiered systems allows more rapid reboot for servers and databases,
improving response time and performance across power cycles and outage events. However,
several challenges to its adoption as a main memory previously identified in the literature
remain unsolved—PCM devices have limited write endurance, an asymmetric and relatively
higher write energy compared to their DRAM counterparts. In the context of a shared com-
puting environment, the added constraint of data confidentiality defeats techniques designed
to reduce energy and exasperates cell wear. These issues persist in the Optane memory
modules, as evidenced by the reported per-cell endurance of circa 106 writes and the use
of AES-XTS encryption to protect private data across power cycles [4, 6]. While it can be
expected that the fabrication process will improve reliability and energy consumption with
later generations of the technology, these fundamental constraints of cell endurance and data
security must be addressed within the memory architecture.
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1.1 Contributions & Acknowledgements
My work to date has focused on designs which can be implemented at the memory con-
troller level to reduce writes, mitigate wear-related faults, and opportunistically improve
dynamic energy in PCM devices. The contributions of this thesis address all of the above,
under the additional constraint that the memory be encrypted. Portions of this work repro-
duce text and images from my publications “A CASTLE with TOWERs for Reliable, Secure
PCM” [7], ©2020 IEEE, and “Toward Secure, Reliable, and Energy Efficient Phase-change
Main Memory with MACE” [8], ©2019 IEEE. Specifically, in this thesis I highlight my
contributions to these works:
• TOWERs, the first technique to combine compression and the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [9] counter-mode encryption in order to find an optimal encoding for
data written to endurance-limited memory cells.
• MACE, a combination of encoding and traditional error-correction schemes to improve
overall memory lifetime in the context of AES-XTS encryption.
• WINDU, an architecture which supports encoding techniques such as MACE applied in
the context of AES-XTS encryption using lightweight compression to reduce overhead.
• LARS, a framework for evaluating the whole-life energy impact of systems using en-
durance limited memories, in collaboration with my co-author Donald Kline Jr.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In the following Chapter 2, I pro-
vide the necessary background material on PCM technology and its characteristics, error
correction schemes for conventional and emerging memories, encoding techniques and their
application to memory, encryption schemes based on the AES algorithm, and the pitfalls of
combining encryption with encoding. Chapter 3 discusses the CASTLE & TOWERs tech-
nique, our simulation framework, our experimental methodology, and the associated results.
Chapter 4 discusses the MACE and WINDU techniques, our simulation framework, our ex-
perimental methodology, and the associated results. Finally, Chapter 5 presents as summary




Endurance limited memories like PCM inevitably encounter endurance faults as their
cells approach their nominal lifetime in writes. Beyond basic wear-leveling, various existing
techniques developed for error correction and encoding on data channels have been applied
to PCM to mitigate these faults. In this chapter, I discuss the relevant characteristics of
PCM and its failure modes, alongside existing techniques which have been used to correct
errors (transient or otherwise) in conventional memory technologies. Following a discus-
sion of encoding, I present the basic operation of the AES algorithm, and its extensions in
Galois-Counter-Mode and AES-XTS. Finally, I present the repercussions of combining error
correction and encoding with encryption, motivating the need for techniques which account
for both.
2.1 Phase Change Memory
PCM is a resistive memory which encodes data in the phase of the material which com-
poses a PCM cell. Chalcogenides like Ge2Sb2Te5 exhibit a relatively high resistance when
in an amorphous phase, and a relatively low resistance when in a crystalline lattice phase.
Thus an access circuit may interpret the higher resistance phase as logical ‘0’ (RESET) and
the lower resistance phase as logical ‘1’ (SET). Figure 1a depicts a typical PCM cell design,
wherein the phase change material is embedded in a substrate and is manipulated via a
heater and a pair of conducting electrodes. When the potential across the electrodes exceeds
a switching threshold (determined by the choice of phase-change material), increased current
flows through the cell and induces Joule heating. When the cell exceeds its melting tempera-
ture (circa 600o C) it enters its amorphous state, where it can be held by abruptly removing
the potential across the cell. This programs the cell to its RESET state, as indicated by the
red pulse in Figure 1b. At the lower crystallization temperature range (circa 100-300o C),
the cell material tends to relax over time into a regular crystalline lattice. In practice, this
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is achieved by applying a longer, lower-current SET pulse as depicted in blue in Figure 1b.
This interaction of time-under-temperature is an important area of research, since PCM cells
have been observed “drifting” toward the crystalline phase in practice at temperatures below
the crystallization temperature [10]. Some architecture designs target the drifting problem
specifically [11], but in general we must rely on error correction mechanisms to identify and
mitigate spurious phase change.
(a) Typical PCM cell architecture. (b) Programming a PCM cell.
Figure 1: A typical PCM cell design and its operation.
The choice of PCM material and cell design is another subject of much research, as it
impacts drifting, the speed of state changes, and the overall endurance of individual cells [12].
Novel cell and substrate designs target reduced thermal conductivity [13], and improved
switching characteristics [14], which support the scaling and performance goals required
to replace DRAM in the long term. However, the inherent limitation on cell endurance
persists—individual PCM cells can only be written circa 108 times before failing to reliably
switch.
A seminal study of PCM reliability classified two permanent failure modes: a failure
which results in permanent low-resistance state (SET failure) and a failure which results
in permanent high-resistance state (RESET failure) [15]. The former is characterized by
a cell remaining in the low-resistance crystalline state in spite of prolonged programming
pulses above the switching threshold, indicating that the switching threshold was no longer
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permitting adequate current to melt the PCM material. Cells in this state exhibited depletion
of Ge and enrichment of Se near the heater element. This “phase-segregation” and field-
induced ion migration are indicated as the underlying causes of the SET failure mode [15, 16].
The second fault mode, RESET failure, is characterized by permanent high-resistance across
a PCM cell. Physical inspection of such cells reveals a physical separation (void) at the
interface of the heater and the phase change material, inhibiting current flow through the
cell and exhibiting a higher resistance than both SET and RESET states [15]. Both fault
modes become more common as cells age, commonly measured by the number of writes to
individual cells. Prototypes in the literature range report a nominal endurance of 104-1012
writes depending on the material, feature size, and operating conditions, with the most
recent commercially available devices rated to 106 writes [4].
The consensus among PCM reliability studies to date is that the extrema of tempera-
ture accelerates cell wear toward failure, especially the melting temperature applied during
a RESET operation. Programming PCM cells requires more time compared to DRAM, rep-
resenting a longer period of energy transfer to any given cell [17]. With improved process,
scaling, and more efficient cell designs, the overall time and energy required to program PCM
cells should reduce [14]. In the interim, reducing the writes and in turn energy transfer to
the cells can simultaneously improve the efficiency and lifetime of PCM devices. When cells
inevitably do fail, we must rely on error detection and correction techniques to prolong the
useful lifetime of memories built with PCM.
2.2 Error Correction Techniques
Error correction techniques are widely applied in noisy and unreliable channels to iden-
tify and correct spurious changes in the data. Most of these techniques were developed to
address transient faults in memories and communication channels, although they can obvi-
ously be applied to permanent or otherwise persistent faults in non-volatile memories. The
most ubiquitous class of error correction techniques are called error correcting codes (ECC),
which compute parity information on a message, and the concatenation of the message and
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its parity form a code word. Modern storage devices typically employ Single-error-correction,
double-error-detection (SECDED) codes which are based on the overlapping parity set tech-
niques of Hamming codes [18]. A typical SECDED codeword consists of 64 data bits plus
eight bits of parity information to match the word size of conventional processors. As the
name implies, SECDED is capable of correcting a single bit in error, or detect (but not
locate) two bits in error per 72-bit codeword. Especially for non-volatile memories like hard
disks and flash, more sophisticated parity encoding schemes have been developed which
correct more bits per correction block, including Reed-Solomon codes [19], Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem codes [20], and Low-density parity codes [21]. All of the above use more
complex representations of the underlying message in polynomials, enhancing the correction
capabilities at the expense of encoding latency and auxiliary storage associated with storing
parity information. Collectively, I will refer to this class of schemes for the remainder of this
text by ECCN, denoting an Error Correcting Code which can correct up to N bits in error
per correction block. In the context of DRAM and main memory, ECC1 (SECDED Ham-
ming codes) is the gold standard for comparison—commodity DRAM designs which provide
ECC already include additional capacity to store parity information, thus ECC1 correction
capability and overhead are a natural benchmark for error correction techniques.
Pointer-based error correction techniques leverage the same auxiliary capacity to instead
store replacement bits for persistent faults in the correction block, alongside a pointer to the
bit address of the faulty location within that block. Error Correcting Pointers [22] operate
on groups of 512 bits, storing N pointers of length log2(512) bits alongside a replacement bit
for each known faulty location, for a total of 10 auxiliary bits required for each correctable
error per block. ECP is more flexible than ECC1 in that it can handle cases where more than
two faults occur within the same correction block, for example if certain rows or columns of
memory exhibit spatial correlation of faults due to process variation [23, 24, 25]. However,
the fact that ECP must use its own pointers to correct faults in the auxiliary space can
quickly degrade the correction capability of the block. Similarly to ECCN, for the remainder
of this text I will refer to this technique by ECPN, where N indicates how many pointers
(and correctable errors) are associated with each correction block.
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An important consideration when mitigating persistent faults is the state of the faulty
cell. For memories using DRAM, a faulty cell would either fail to charge or fail to hold its
charge—in both cases, reading the cell would yield logical ‘0’ at the sense amplifier. For
PCM, depending on which failure mode occurred first, reading a faulty cell could result in
logical ‘1’ (SET failure) or logical ‘0’ (RESET failure). In both cases, the fact that these
“stuck” cells can still produce a value when read offers an opportunity to improve fault
mitigation. If a SET failure occurs, and a ‘1’ is to be written to that cell, then there is
no error, and we call that cell “stuck-at-right” (SA-R). If instead a ‘0’ is to be written to
that cell, then the fault creates an error, and we call that cell “stuck-at-wrong”(SA-W). In
the context of the above error correction schemes, fault tolerance can be improved provided
there is a way to identify and track persistent faults as they develop. To this end, several
schemes have been introduced in the literature to identify faults and encode them into a
fault map [26, 27, 28]. For the remainder of this work, I assume that such a mechanism is
in place.
Both of the above error correction schemes are widely employed to mitigate faults in
non-volatile memories, but there are more general transformations of data which can be
employed to a similar effect. In the next section, I present the concept of coset encoding and
its common uses in write reduction and error correction.
2.3 Coset Encoding
Sets of codes collectively referred to as Cosets are used to modify data (typically via XOR)
to match a desired pattern before writing it to some media. In the context of this work,
the most relevant target is reducing writes and masking endurance faults, although these
techniques are general enough to target arbitrary optimization goals such as reducing specific
data symbols, reducing dynamic energy, or reducing changes of data values. As I will show in
Chapters 3 and 4, choosing a coset approach which provides many candidate transformations
can evaluate multiple objectives at once; if there are more than one transformation which
meet a primary objective such as masking faults, a secondary objective such as energy
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reduction can be applied to select the best coset. One of the most simple applications of
coset transformation is to invert data. Data Bus Inversion (DBI) [29] was developed to
reduce energy associated with data transmission over high-speed bus lines, but the approach
is functionally equivalent to reducing writes in a memory. If the data block being written
would result in more than half of all cells changing state, then simply inverting the data
before writing it reduces changes and in turn wear on the underlying memory.
The block inversion approach belongs to a class of geometric error correction schemes
which reinterpret blocks of data as flattened matrices, which are then separated into parti-
tions that can be inverted to mask the effects of persistently faulty cells. Flip-N-Write [30]
adapts DBI to memory applications with finer-granularity correction blocks. SAFER [31]
uses a similar structure to ECP to point to specific partitions and indicate if they should be
inverted. This basic idea is extended by AEGIS [32] to allow more sophisticated partitioning
schemes, improving the likelihood that faults will fall in different partitions which in turn
improves the likelihood that inverting partitions can mask two or more faults. Of course,
there are tradeoffs to consider in how partition membership and inversion are encoded, but
depending on the fault tolerance needs of the system, this increased auxiliary overhead may
be acceptable.
The aforementioned coset techniques are most effective when data exhibit patterns, i.e.,
data are biased toward specific values. For example, binary representations of integers such
as two’s complement tend to use less than the full range of the bits allocated, resulting in
the most significant bits being all ‘0’ or all ‘1’ most of the time. In this case, simply applying
DBI at the granularity of half the word size will effectively reduce writes to upper half of
the memory cells in each word.
Unfortunately, in the context of encrypted non-volatile memory, the patterns which make
these techniques effective are removed. Private user data, security-critical operating system
code, and sensitive authentication tokens might exist in main memory at any given time,
necessitating encryption to protect data in the event of power disruption or side-channel at-
tack. One of the primary goals of encryption is data confidentiality: by design, the encrypted
version of any message should not reveal any information about the message itself. Thus
if we employ encryption, we must adopt coset techniques which account for the apparent
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randomness of encrypted data. To this end, the use of random cosets can be effective [33, 34].
Consider the ideal case where every word of length N has an equal probability of ‘0’ or ‘1’
for each bit. Thus in any given word, the probability of exactly x bits changing follows







· 0.5x · 0.5N−x (1)
The closed-form expression for the expected value of bit changes is given by N · p, where
here N represents the length of the data block in bits and p = 0.5 represents the probability
that any given bit will be changed during a write. Thus on average, we expect an equal
number of bits to change in any given word when both the existing and new data are unbiased.
This result is the theoretical basis for the poor performance of inversion techniques under
effectively randomized data. Previous study demonstrated that for unbiased, effectively
random data, using pseudorandom-valued cosets consistently outperforms techniques which
target biased data [34]. This motivates the use of encrypted data and other artifacts of the
encryption process as cosets in Chapters 3 and 4.
In the next section, the basic concepts of AES encryption and its common applications
in AES-GCM and AES-XTS are presented alongside their relative strengths and weaknesses
for use with non-volatile memory.
2.4 AES-Based Encryption
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [9] was introduced in 2001 as the standard
cipher for cryptography, based on the Rijndael algorithm published in a prior work [35].
AES is a symmetric key algorithm wherein a secret input key (128, 192, or 256 bits long)
is distributed to approved parties, which is used along with 128-bit blocks of plaintext data
as input to produce 128-bit blocks of encrypted ciphertext as output. The algorithm itself
consists of several rounds with four distinct steps which transform each of the 16 bytes in
the 128-bit input:
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• Substitute Bytes: each byte of input is used to index a lookup table, implementing a
nonlinear transformation as shown in Figure 2a.
• Shift Rows: each row i in a 4x4 row-major matrix of the input is barrel shifted by i byte
positions as shown in Figure 2b.
• Mix Columns: The 4x4 row-major matrix of the input is multiplied by a fixed transfor-
mation matrix to implement an invertible linear transformation on its columns as shown
in Figure 2c.
• Add Round Key: The secret key and the round number k is used to generate a round
key. This round key is applied via bitwise XOR to the input data as shown in Figure 2d.
(a) AES substitute bytes step using a pre-
generated lookup table.
(b) AES shift rows step.
(c) AES mix columns step via matrix multi-
ply with transform c(x)
(d) AES add round key step via XOR.
Figure 2: The four transformation steps used in each round of AES encryption.
The various steps are repeated for each of {10, 12, 14} rounds for {128, 192, 256}-bit
keys, respectively, where the input of the first round is the plaintext data and the input of
subsequent rounds is the output of the previous round. Each step is invertible, thus the
10
decryption process is the same but with all rounds and steps applied in reverse order, using
the secret key and the ciphertext as the initial input. However, to sufficiently disperse data
which may span many encryption blocks, AES is commonly used in Cipher Block Chain
(CBC) mode.
                                       
            
          
   
          
            
          
   
          
            
          
   
          
                           
Figure 3: AES Electronic Code Book mode.
                                         
            
          
   
          
         
            
          
   
          
         
            
          
   
          
         
                          
Figure 4: AES Cipher Block Chain mode.
If each block is encrypted independently (commonly referred to as Electronic Code Book
(ECB) mode, see Figure 3), patterns in the data are exposed in the output. The reason for
this is that for any given plaintext and secret key pair, the output of the AES algorithm
is deterministic. Thus if there are patterns in the data which span the length of the 128-
bit encryption block size, those patterns will persist as their encrypted ciphertexts will be
identical. To remedy this, CBC mode replaces the input to encryption block i by the
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ciphertext of block (i − 1) XOR’d with the plaintext of block i as shown in Figure 4. With
proper padding to a multiple of the 128-bit block size, this ensures that data dispersion is not
sensitive to the size of the input data. This approach is well-suited for encrypting streams
of data, but limits the amount of parallelization that can be applied. As an alternative for
performance-sensitive applications, Galois counter-mode [36](GCM) was developed.
2.4.1 AES in Galois-Counter-Mode
Figure 5 shows the basic operation of AES-GCM. For each encryption block, a counter is
maintained, which is concatenated with a nonce value to form the input of the AES algorithm
in ECB mode along with the secret key. The output of the AES algorithm is commonly
called the one-time-pad (OTP), which is then applied via XOR to the corresponding block of
plaintext to produce the ciphertext output. Decryption follows this process in reverse, where
the counter value is read to reproduce the OTP, which is then XOR’d with the ciphertext to
recover the plaintext.
                            
            
          
     
         
       
        
   
         
          
            
          
     
         
       
        
   
         
          
            
          
     
         
       
        
   
         
          
Figure 5: AES Galois counter-mode.
This approach is “embarrassingly parallel,” making it desirable for high-bandwidth appli-
cations like encrypting memory. However, in order to maintain the security of this approach,
it is critical that the nonce values must never be reused. If a malicious actor knew that a
nonce value was reused, they can encrypt a known plaintext and greatly reduce the search
space for the output of the AES block. Likewise, it is important that the counter values be



















Figure 6: counter-mode encryption in the memory controller. Reproduced from [7], ©2020
IEEE
Memory systems which implement AES-GCM typically adopt an architecture as shown
in Figure 6. The counter sits alongside the encrypted data in memory, which is manipulated
and used with hardware-implemented AES to implement AES-GCM within the memory
controller. With careful coordination of write queues, the AES block latency can be pipelined
to take advantage of parallelism.
Unfortunately, the encryption process complicates its use with non-volatile memories.
As noted in Section 2.3, encryption removes any patterns in the data, making it difficult to
reduce writes by encoding or differential write. Likewise, encodings which target reducing
energy-intensive symbols are defeated by the apparent randomness of the ciphertext being
written back to memory. Every bit in memory has an equal likelihood of being ‘0’ or ‘1’, as
does the new data being written, so on average we expect half of the bits to change in any
given write.
DEUCE, or Dual Counter Encryption [37], attempts to overcome this by introducing the
concept of an epoch, such that at the beginning of the epoch, the encrypted row is written
directly, but thereafter only dirty words are encrypted and rewritten with a subcounter.
SECRET or Smartly EnCRypted Energy EfficienT non-volatile memories [38] improves upon
DEUCE by allocating a dedicated “sub-counter” for data blocks within the row. The sub-
counter maintains independent count values for each block within an epoch. When a sub-
counter saturates, the epoch ends—the main counter is advanced, all sub-counters are reset,
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the entire row is encrypted, and the result written with the new count value. SECRET
addresses reliability by allocating ECP per row to tolerate faults. DEUCE does not consider
reliability and SECRET provides significant savings over DEUCE at the cost of additional
sub-counter bits [38].
Another work proposes using the counter value to track how often cells have been writ-
ten. As the counter approaches the rated endurance of the PCM cell, more capable error
correction schemes are activated to prolong the useful life of the memory [39]. CASTLE &
TOWERs is complementary to this approach as it reduces wear throughout the memory life-
time, prolonging the interval of time in which the lower-overhead ECC is used or helping to
achieve a particular uncorrectable bit-error rate (UBER) with a lower overall ECC storage.
Another approach is to co-design the encryption scheme and the wear-leveling scheme of the
memory controller. A smaller counter can be used in tandem with the physical address if
that address will only be written some fixed amount of times before remapping, resulting in
improved overhead and latency [40]. Again, CASTLE & TOWERs is complementary since
its reliability and energy advantages can be realized within a small window of writes to any
given address.
These techniques collectively improve the performance of encrypted main memory sys-
tems, but other approaches have been standardized for non-volatile and hybrid memory
systems to improve security at rest. In the next section, we describe the AES-XTS algo-
rithm which was originally designed for hard disk encryption, and later adapted for use in
commercial PCM [6].
2.4.2 The AES-XTS Encryption Algorithm
AES-CBC provides data confidentiality, but can be manipulated—if it is possible for
a malicious actor to know parts of the plaintext data, say shared information on a system
which always uses encryption, then the attacker can inject their own plaintext into alternating
blocks of memory using a Malleability Attack [41]. For storage-class memories, the strategy
adopted as the standard to mitigate such attacks is XOR-Encrypt-XOR Tweakable block
cipher with ciphertext Stealing (XTS) [42]. This standard is combined with an existing block
14
cipher encryption algorithm (i.e., AES) to ensure that data cannot be modified undetected
in secure systems. This is especially important for storage-class memories, where some data
accesses may be few and far between, and both confidentiality and authenticity of data must
be guaranteed.
                                                           
            
          
    
          
         
            
          
         
    
            
          
    
  
          
            
          
         
    
 
          
Figure 7: Example of XTS for block cipher encryption.
The key mechanisms of AES-XTS are an XOR operation before and after encryption—the
XEX portion—and the use of part of the ciphertext in the last block’s input—the ciphtertext
stealing. Figure 7 depicts the basic architecture of XTS systems. Two keys are used for
separate block cipher encryptions: one to generate a OTP from an initial value, fed forward
to all encryption blocks (KEY2 in Figure 7), and a second for use in encryption between the
XOR operations (KEY1 in Figure 7). Usually this is implemented with a single symmetric
key (e.g., 256-bit) split in half. The initial value is an arbitrary non-negative integer, but
is essentially a constant function of the address being encrypted.
The first iteration of XEX was based on AES-GCM to exploit its performance benefits.
However, vulnerabilities in this approach [43] necessitated the addition of a “tweaking”
adjustment represented by the chain of multiplications by α in Figure 7. To support arbitrary
data block sizes, the ciphertext-stealing approach was added, which pads the final encryption
block input by a portion of the penultimate encryption block output, as shown in red. The
resultant algorithm was adopted as a standard for disk encryption where data access control
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or authentication via data expansion methods is not feasible [44].
Unfortunately, the additional transformations of the XEX and tweaking steps combined
with the chaining of the final two blocks of the ciphertext-stealing step complicate the effi-
cient application of cosets. MACE and its supporting architecture WINDU were designed
to overcome these complications, providing an adjustable balance among write reduction,
energy reduction, and performance.
In the next chapter, I present the concepts of CASTLE counter-mode encryption, my
contribution TOWERs to efficiently encode encrypted data, and how they are used together
to reduce cell writes, mitigate endurance faults, and reduce energy in encrypted memories
using PCM technology.
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3.0 CASTLE & TOWERs
“Counter Advance for Secure, Tailored Lifetime Extension” (CASTLE) is a technique
which uses artifacts of the encryption process to extend the lifetime of encrypted PCM.
CASTLE and its primary mechanism counter advance are based on AES counter-mode en-
cryption: Each memory row has a counter value used to generate a OTP, which is subdivided
into sub-counters associated with blocks of memory within the row. By incrementing sub-
counters independently, a set of OTPs can be generated on a per-block basis. Using these
blocks and the coset transformation techniques described in Section 2.3, CASTLE can mask
stuck-at faults and prolong the lifetime of the memory.
“Techniques for Optimizing Wear and Energy Reduction” (TOWERs) is a novel encoding
technique which leverages random cosets and compression to improve fault tolerance and
reduce dynamic energy. Since counter-mode encryption preserves the plaintext until the
final step of XOR by the OTP, TOWERs can apply lightweight compression to create space
for encoding auxiliary information required by cosets. This allows TOWERs to efficiently
evaluate several candidate words for writeback, which are then optimized for write reduction,
fault tolerance, and energy reduction. Together with CASTLE, TOWERs can dramatically
improve memory lifetime while opportunistically reducing energy.
Portions of this chapter reproduce text and images with permission from my publication
“A CASTLE with TOWERs for Reliable, Secure PCM” [7] ©2020 IEEE. The concept
“counter advance” and the derived technique CASTLE are presented herein for reference,
but these are attributed to my co-author Donald Kline Jr. as an extension of a previous
publication [45].
3.1 CASTLE Counter-mode Encryption
CASTLE’s primary mechanism counter advance leverages the property that encryption
of plaintext with a new counter generates a new random ciphertext. Recall that in the
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event of a PCM endurance failure, data which matches the stuck-at value is SA-R and data
opposed to the stuck-at value is SA-W. When writing a ciphertext candidate in the presence
of stuck-at faults, each faulty cell has a 50% probability of being SA-R, and similar for SA-
W. Thus, by incrementing the counter, it is possible to improve fault tolerance by finding a
ciphertext candidate that maximizes SA-Rs.
Consider the example in Figure 8 for a row with two stuck-at faults such that, given the
ciphertext, the first is SA-R and the second is SA-W. Advancing the counter (Counter+1)
resulted in the first fault becoming SA-W and the second becoming SA-R. This is due to the
property that each fault in each ciphertext candidate has a 50% chance to be SA-R, but is
equally likely to be SA-W. Advancing the counter again (Counter+2) was unlucky, resulting
in two SA-Ws. The probability of finding an error-free candidate with f faults is 2−f , or 25%
for f=2, which required multiple advancements in the example. Both word-level encryption
and error correction can dramatically reduce the number of advancements to find an error-
free candidate. For example, with single bit error correction (e.g., ECP-1), the example of
Figure 8 would have been successful without counter advancement. If SECRET is used with
independent sub-counters per block and assuming all blocks were dirty, blocks zero to two
would have been written with Counter and block three would have used Counter+1. Since
a sub-counter exists for each block, only the sub-counter for block three would be advanced.
The application of CASTLE with block level encryption and error correction is shown
in Figure 9. Figure 9a expands on Figure 6 with sub-counters per 128-bit block in the style
Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter	
Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter+1	
Word3	 Word3	
Word3	 Word3	
Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter+2	 Word3	 Word3	
Block0	 Block1	 Block2	 Block3	 Counter+k	 Word3	 Word3	
Figure 8: CASTLE example for one memory line. Green indicates a SA-R fault and orange















































(b) ECP encoding flow.
Figure 9: Block level CASTLE architecture.
of SECRET [38]. CASTLE applied in this context examines the stuck-at bits independently
between blocks and only advances the counter when SA-W bits appear. Stuck-at faults can
be determined by storing and reading patterns of all ‘1’s and ‘0’s or using a fault cache [31]
or fault map [27]. It is straightforward to extend block-level encryption with ECC as the
parity bits (e.g., SECDED [64,72] ECC) would not cross block boundaries. In this case,
CASTLE could protect fewer SA-W errors and allow ECC protection to correct others at
the cost of reduced transient error protection.
ECP, in contrast, uses pointers that are shared by the blocks of a given row. Block-level
CASTLE offers the trade off of using a pointer or advancing the counter to mitigate a fault.
Using a pointer will reduce the availability of pointers to tolerate faults in other blocks. The
algorithm for selecting the appropriate write candidate for ECP with CASTLE is shown in
Figure 9b. Since auxiliary bits for ECC parity or ECP are designated per-row and must
be stored in plaintext form, CASTLE does not interfere with the operation of either error
mitigation technique.
Assuming a counter advancement epoch window w where w = 2b and b is the number
of bits for each sub-counter, w serves as a threshold of how many counter values will be
explored to accomplish a particular write successfully. If the encrypted data experiences E
errors (i.e., SA-Ws) but E is less than a threshold T , the write proceeds with the current
counter value c. Otherwise, if this is the “best” candidate seen so far (i.e., fewest SA-Ws),
it is retained. If c is still within the epoch w, c is incremented and the next candidate is
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evaluated. If c reaches the limit of the epoch without finding a candidate within the error
threshold, the best candidate is written if sufficient ECP pointers are available, otherwise
the write fails. In our evaluation we consider two schemes: the counter minimization (CM)
approach sets T to the number of available ECP pointers, allowing a write to proceed with
the minimum counter value that discovers a possible solution, while the pointer minimization
(PM) approach sets T=1 requiring a fault free solution to write immediately.
In the next section, I present the concept of TOWERs, how it leverages compression to
reduce overhead associated with coset encoding, and how it is used to improve lifetime and
dynamic energy in encrypted PCM.
3.2 TOWERs
Due to the encryption process, the output written back to memory has been effectively
randomized; any existing similarities in the plaintext data will be obscured and distributed
among the bits of the ciphertext by the encryption method. CASTLE leverages this property
to generate new storage candidates that better match the faulty PCM cells. However, this
randomness presents two challenges. The first challenge is that these randomized storage val-
ues defeat techniques which rely on similarity. The second challenge is that the randomness
incurs more bit changes, in turn increasing write energy and accelerating wear.
One strategy to minimize the resulting bits written to preserve endurance (and minimize
dynamic energy) is to use cosets to encode the data before writing it back, as presented
in Section 2.3. This applies for plaintext data that has similarity [46], apparently random
data [47], and hybrid data that contains both [34]. This strategy can similarly be an effective
way to extend the lifetime of a memory in the face of stuck-at bits. In the context of encrypted
data, the use of a biased code which performs well for plaintext will not benefit, and may
even hamper encoding goals. For strictly unbiased random data, it is more effective to use
a random code [34].
Unfortunately, employing cosets of any kind introduces additional overhead bits which
are necessary to encode the specific coset candidate applied to each word. These bits consume
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the available capacity for users or the error correction scheme, and writing these bits may
degrade the energy benefit. One method to mitigate this overhead is to leverage lightweight
compression of the data and make room for storing these auxiliary bits in the cache line
itself.
3.2.1 Compression & Encoding of Encrypted Data
Several such compression schemes have been proposed, which typically leverage common
patterns of the data for their compression [46, 48]. The challenge for encrypted data is that
it will not exhibit these patterns required for effective compression. Instead, data can be
compressed prior to encryption. The coset can then be applied to the compressed data and
the reclaimed space can be used to store the encoding. Using block-cipher encryption, each
coset candidate must then be passed through the cipher to create a candidate for writing.
For N cosets applied over M blocks, (N − 1) ·M additional encryptions would be required


















Figure 10: Generating a writeback candidate for TOWER using the counter-mode AES
output, the compressible plaintext data, and a table of coset codes.
In counter-mode encryption, as shown in Figure 6, the AES block cipher block is gener-
ated once per cache line and applied via the OTP. Thus, each encoded coset candidate can
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be encrypted with the cost of a single XOR operation, allowing us to utilize the compression
and encryption in the same process. Figure 10 demonstrates this process: First, the data d
is compressed to to yield the compressed data d′ in dark blue and the reclaimed bits shown
in light blue. Next, in parallel, each coset candidate (yellow) is applied to a compressed word
via XOR (green), and appended with the binary coset ID (lightgreen→red). Finally, the AES
OTP is applied, also via XOR (gray), and the resulting data is evaluated for writeback.
The effectiveness of TOWERs relies on compressibility of the words within the cache line.
In contrast with general compression needs, here compression coverage is more important
than compression ratio. Compression coverage is the percentage of cache line writes that can
be encoded in compressed form, which is distinct from compression ratio which describes
the ratio of data length before and after compression. To achieve a higher coverage, I
implemented a relaxed version of MTC [48] which only attempted to recover five bits per
word for all compression cases. Standard MTC attempts to discover if the most significant
eight bits of each word in a cache line are either (1) uniform (all 1’s or 0’s) or (2) identical for
each word in the line. Because of the needs of our encoding, we relax this to only requiring
the leading six bits to be uniform or identical across all words of the line. This scheme
requires two auxiliary bits per cache line to signify that the cache line was compressible and
to encode which compression scheme was applied.
Given a particular coset, a encrypted coset candidate can be selected to optimize one
of many factors such as energy [47, 46] and endurance, among others. Given that the
primary concern for PCM is to maximize fault tolerance, the most appropriate candidate
for writeback is one where the count of SA-W bits is minimized, to maximize the likelihood
that the remaining faults can be addressed by the error correction scheme.
However, given the limited endurance of the memory, during the memory lifetime, the
fault rate will change and the number of stuck-at bits encountered will increase. This will
reduce the probability of any given coset to correct the SA-W bits, and in turn reduce the
number of candidates available. Thus, during the portion of the lifetime where there are
multiple acceptable fault tolerance candidates, there is an opportunity to employ coset tech-
niques to improve endurance and potentially also reduce energy. Rather than simply choose
the first acceptable candidate, we propose selecting the best candidate more intelligently.
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Just as differential write extends the PCM lifetime by reducing the stress on endurance [49],
selecting the best coset candidate that mitigates faults and optimizes endurance can sim-
ilarly improve lifetime. Furthermore, since RESETs require more energy than SETs [17],
and are more detrimental to the endurance of PCM, we benefit from a reduction of RESET
operations.
If multiple candidates are available that either minimize SA-Ws, or that have SA-Ws
that can all be addressed by error correction, a candidate can be selected that also optimizes
other metrics. This multi-objective coset optimization approach is discussed in the next
section.
3.2.2 Multi-objective Coset Encoding
Among the acceptable candidates from a fault tolerance perspective, we can define the
best candidate in terms of a secondary optimization parameter. In this context, the count
of RESETS incurred (or the differential write energy required) could be used to rank coset
candidates with the same fault tolerance. At any given time, there may be multiple solutions
which meet the SA-W constraint. However, determining the optimal coset candidate is cost-
prohibitive. Instead, we adopt a heuristic to pare down the candidates based on SA-W
minimization. In the case of a tie, the coset candidate that also minimizes the secondary
metric, in this case endurance—modeled as the number of RESET bits—can be selected.
We can improve on this approach if we relax the reliability constraint. If the number
of SA-W bits that can be corrected by the memory controller’s correction scheme is higher
than the number of faults encountered, it may be reasonable to accept a higher number of
faults if we have an overall improvement in the secondary metric. For example, if there were
five SA-W faults in a cache line, for a memory controller using ECP-6, then the pool of
acceptable writeback candidates could be extended to include those with six SA-W bits, but
only if the impact of utilizing those extra encoding bits results in a net decrease in RESETs.
Algorithm 1 conceptually defines the heuristic. For each word we track two fault classes,
the minimum and second minimum number of faults across all the coset candidates. Within
each class, the best coset is selected such that the overall cost of the secondary parameter
23
Data: cosets[N], best coset b, next best coset nb
1 for c ∈ cosets do
2 if countSAW(c) < countSAW(b) then
3 nb←− b
4 b←− c
5 else if countSAW(c) == countSAW(b) then
6 if cost(c) < cost(b) then
7 b←− c
8 end
9 else if countSAW(c) < countSAW(nb) then
10 nb←− c
11 else if countSAW(c) == countSAW(nb) then




Algorithm 1: Selecting a coset candidate for each word
is minimized. Both a best and next best coset candidate are tracked at the word level. In
particular, lines 2-4 check to see if the current evaluated candidate has better SA-W than
the current best candidate, and if so keeps this as the new best candidate and demotes the
previous best candidate to next best. Lines 5-8 check and keep the current candidate if it
has the same SA-W bits and a better secondary cost function. Lines 9-10 keep the candidate
as the next best candidate if it has less SA-W than the previous next best candidate. Lines
11-13 keep the candidate as the next best candidate if it has the same SA-W but a better
secondary cost as the previous next best candidate. The algorithm can be applied in parallel
over all words in a cache line, and the testing procedure can use a tree-wise reduction to
obtain the top two coset candidates for each word.
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For the secondary cost metric to overcome the increase in SA-Ws, the benefit of selecting
a coset candidate with more SA-W bits should outweigh the cost of using the additional
correction bits. Consider the case of RESET bits for minimizing endurance. For a 512-bit
cache line, ECP requires nine bits of address plus one bit as a spare. We assume that the
address bits and spare bit have an equal likelihood of being ‘1’ or ‘0’ for any given fault.
Thus, using an ECP entry will require writing half of those bits on average. Likewise, there
is a 50% chance that the replacement bit already matches the value it is to store. Of the
50% of correction bits changing, on average half will be SETs and half RESETs. So for a
cache line of n bits, we can define a threshold T which captures the number of RESETs that







If average energy was to be the secondary metric we would replace RESETs in Eq. 2
with (ESET +ERESET ) where ESET and ERESET are the energy cost in joules for a SET and
RESET operation, respectively. If we can observe an endurance improvement (or energy
reduction) greater than this threshold by some margin, we expect to see an improvement by
switching to a coset code which results in the additional SA-W bit(s).
There is the potential to end up with more SA-W bits per cache line than the error
correction scheme can correct with Algorithm 1. In a reasonable worst case, we expect one
additional SA-W per word, which means eight additional SA-W bits per 512-bit cache line.
To avoid this situation, if the selected next best candidates would cause the write to fail
(more total SA-W than the correction scheme can correct), then only the best candidates
are chosen. This will allow the algorithm to opportunistically reduce the secondary cost,
while avoiding taking on more SA-W bits than the correction scheme can support. In this
way, coset techniques can be applied to encrypted data to mitigate stuck-at faults while
reducing wear and energy consumption.
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3.3 Experimental Setup for CASTLE & TOWERs
To evaluate CASTLE and TOWERs we created a modified Pintool [50] to monitor all
writebacks encountered at the lowest-level, unified cache. Using the instrumentation, Pin
was attached to runs of individual SPEC2017 benchmarks [51], extracting the address and
data of 512-bit cache lines as they were evicted. The aforementioned benchmarks were
selected to be representative of general contemporary and future workloads. Among the
SPEC2017 benchmark suite, the benchmarks in Table 1 provide excellent coverage of the
full suite by virtue of their similarity to the remaining benchmarks[52]. Also included were
any benchmarks which exhibited a relatively high percentage of load and store operations.
All benchmarks were compiled using the SPEC base and speed metrics, and executed using
reference workloads. SPECCPU 2017 workloads were selected over 2018 IaaS Cloud bench-
marks for this experiment as the former was found to be more appropriate for testing and
evaluating a single server instance [53].
Table 1: SPEC2017 benchmarks used to generate memory traces
Benchmark Application Domain
602.gcc s, 600.perlbench s Compiler
625.x264 s,657.xz s Compression
605.mcf s Combinatorial Optimization
620.omnetpp s DE Simulation
623.xalancbmk s Document Processing
603.bwaves s, 619.lbm s Fluid Dynamics
621.wrf s Climatology
631.deepsjeng s, 641.leela s AI
When testing the reliability of proposed and existing correction schemes at fixed fault
rates, we used tools from PREMSim [54] to generate fault snapshots, which matched five
predefined fault incidence rates: 10−2, 10−3, 10−4, 10−5, and 10−6. These fault snapshots
represent different points along the lifetime of the memory. They describe faulty bits stuck
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at ‘0’ or ‘1,’ and use a Bayesian distribution to mimic the impact of process variation with
spatial correlation of faults [25]. Each fault snapshot was prepared for a 2GB memory,
where fault locations are specified at the bit level (row i, column j). Under simulation, fault
vectors were created from the fault snapshot for each cache line writeback based on the trace
address.
To evaluate the effectiveness of CASTLE and the counter advance concept, SECRET was
used as the comparison baseline [38] assuming three bits were allocated as a sub-counter for
each block, setting w = 8. Note, SECRET assumes ECP-6, which we assume for the baseline
unless otherwise stated. Snapshots of high cell failure rates (10−3 and 10−2) representing later
points during the memory lifetime were used as stimuli for counter advance. A “word-level”
64-bit block size was selected to match the word size in modern architectures.
As noted in Section 3.4.3, the effectiveness of TOWERs relies on compressibility of the
words within the cache line. To determine the compression coverage of a given cache line
writeback, we applied our relaxed version of MTC [48] to compress writebacks generated
from each of the workloads to completion. We also determined smaller 1M and 5M access
windows during each workload that best matched the overall compressibility of the workload.
These sample windows were used for TOWER experiments that evaluated the impact of coset
encoding. When using TOWER with a compressible cache line, we have the potential to
utilize different numbers of coset codes. Depending on the compression ratio, the reclaimed
bits m can encode 2m codes. A larger number of coset codes provides more opportunities
for fault correction, but we expect diminishing returns beyond a certain number of codes.
To determine the appropriate number of codes to use, memory traces were evaluated using
sets where m ∈ 2..7, i.e., sets of 4 to 128 code words. Randomly generated cosets were used
to generate writeback candidates across 1M representative cache line writes, and the mean
across benchmarks was used to assess tradespace between coset size and SA-W reduction.
The cosets in TOWER are not only beneficial for reliability. As described in Section 3.2.2,
memory traces were evaluated via Algorithm 1 to optimize SA-W bits as a primary opti-
mization objective, and then either differential write energy or RESETs as a secondary
optimization objective. To assess which of these secondary objectives was most beneficial,
we observed SA-W bits, total write energy, and the total count of RESETs, over 5M cache
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line writebacks. A set of 31 pseudo-randomly generated coset codes were fixed for the dura-
tion of the experiment. An identity code of all ‘0’s was used to allow the cache lines to be
written back relatively unperturbed. For each writeback, the control case applies baseline
SECRET, which uses counter-mode encryption to the plaintext data, then evaluates the
above criteria on the dirty words requiring writeback. The experimental case first attempts
to compress the plaintext input via our relaxed MTC [48]. If the line is not compressible,
the writeback is processed as with the control case. Otherwise, a coset is selected via Algo-
rithm 1, the best coset is applied, the counter-mode encryption is applied, the coset ID is
encoded in the reclaimed bits, and finally the above criteria are evaluated. In both cases,
a randomly-initialized memory tracks the last data written back to each address, such that
the differential write energy is accurate. Note, if MTC changes compression methods, all
words are considered dirty and must be written.
In order to understand the impact of PCM feature size on write energy, we tracked the
number of SET and RESET operations incurred for each of the workloads both with and
without CASTLE with TOWERs. Using the reported [55] and derived [17] write energy
parameters for existing and future feature size, this permits a comparison of how the scal-
ing of write energy influences the effectiveness of the secondary optimization parameter in
TOWERs.
To estimate the overhead of the coset approach, Verilog implementations and ROM look-
up tables were synthesized using Synopsys Design Compiler targeting 22nm technology and
CACTI [56] was used to model and estimate SRAM storage, following a similar methodology
in the literature [57].
To experimentally evaluate the effect of our techniques on PCM lifetimes, our lifetime
study examined improvements compared to SECRET and encrypted data protected with
AEGIS. We assumed that the distribution of cell lifetime in PCM followed a normal distri-
bution with spatial correlation of faults [24, 25], with a mean failure rate of 108 writes [32, 58].
We assumed a base coefficient of variation of 0.2 [32, 58]. We also conducted a sensitivity
study with higher variations of 0.25 and 0.3 to approximate the effect of scaling on process
variation. As process variation increases with scaling, the memory will incur cell faults more
quickly and better error correction will be necessary to maintain effective lifetimes. The co-
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Figure 11: Cell fault rate for different coefficients of variation.
efficient of variation of cell failure distribution is a commonly used representation of process
variation, as shown in Figure 11, where with increasing process variation 10−2 fault rates
will be approached with fewer writes. The lifetime study occurred on a 1MB segment of the
memory with 4kB pages, consistent with prior work [58] with memory row sizes of 512 bits.
We assumed a perfectly uniform wear-leveling approach where each address receives an equal
amount of writes, which serves as an approximation for proposals in the literature which ap-
proach [59, 60] or exceed [58] this standard. Wear leveling is combined with differential
write to reduce the frequency of cells written for each operation. Under these conditions, the
simulations continuously issue writes to memories protected by the techniques under study,
until there are four rows with unrecoverable faults [59], which delineates the memory lifetime
such that we can determine their lifetime improvement. The results shown are an average
of 10 lifetime experiments.
Finally, to model the performance impact of CASTLE and TOWERs compared to the
SECRET baseline, we used the SNIPER full-system simulator [62] with the parameters
shown in Table 2. To understand the impacts of PCM device parameters on performance and
energy we reported results for a device at 90nm [55]. We also conducted sensitivity studies for
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Table 2: Architecture parameters for performance study.
CPU Cache
4 out-of-order cores Private L1 32kB inst., 32kB data
4 issue width, 4GHz clock Private L2 256kB/core
28nm technology Associativity: 8 (L1 data and L2)
1GHz frequency Block size: 64B
Memory: PCM
512-bit row, 64-bit words, 2GB main memory
2 channels, 1 rank/channel, 8 banks/rank
4 AES units, 111ns delay [61]
TOWER+32 cosets encode/decode: 2.63ns/0.89ns [46]
energy savings and performance impact for 180nm, 90nm, 45nm, 32nm, and 28nm using PCM
devices reported in the literature [55, 17] and modeled using peripheral circuitry reported
by NVSim [63].To model a system employing CASTLE and TOWER, we used estimates of
encryption delay from [61] and estimates of coset delay from the hardware implementation
study, assuming up to four AES operations could be performed simultaneously.
3.4 Results
Based on the experimental setup described in Section 3.3, we conducted detailed evalu-
ations of CASTLE and TOWERs individually to see the impact of each contribution. We
then combined them together to evaluate a full system benefit.
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3.4.1 CASTLE Study
Figure 12 shows a summary of the uncorrectable bit error rate, defined as the number of
bit errors that occur per bit written, for both row (CASTLEr) and block-level (CASTLEw)
encryption with different strengths of error correction used to protect the data and counter
bits. With no error correction, word-level CASTLE (CASTLEw) provides two orders of
magnitude improvement in UBER compared to word-level encryption alone for as high as a
10−3 cell failure rate. As error correction is employed the improvement is amplified, providing
3–5 orders of magnitude improvement by introducing one ECP pointer (ECP-1). At a
cell failure rate of 10−3, an UBER of ≤10−11 required only ECP-4 for word and row CA.
Employing PM reduced the requirement to ECP-3. In contrast, SECRET, which includes
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Figure 12: UBER for various error rates. CASTLE explores one epoch (w=8), except where
noted. CASTLEw+ECP is reported for CM with an error bar indicating PM.
At a cell failure rate of 10−2, unsurprisingly, UBER is drastically reduced. Using ECP-
6, CASTLE achieves almost a 10−9 UBER versus 10−6 for SECRET. Relaxing CASTLE
to explore eight epochs allowed CASTLEw with PM to function at a <10−11 UBER with
ECP-4 and higher. This indicates that while a device might operate using the CM approach
initially to minimize counter advancements, it could switch into PM and expand the searching
window for gracefully degraded operation when the cell failure rate became sufficiently high.
CASTLE is sensitive to block size. Small block sizes increase the flexibility to eliminate
faults. A sensitivity study indicates CASTLE is nearly as effective for 64-bit blocks as 32-bit
blocks. 128-bit blocks have a noticeable degradation (0.5-1 orders of magnitude UBER),
particularly with ECC and ECP, however, the CASTLE improvements are still dramatic.
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A logical concern about CASTLE is the impact to performance from evaluating multiple
ciphertext candidates and the potential to saturate the encryption counter more quickly.
Figure 13 shows the number of counter increments per write operation. Word-level encryp-
tion naturally reduces the average counter advancements per write (A) to A=0.96 compared
to the row-level baseline of A=1, as each write only advances the dirty words’ sub-counters.
This provides sufficient “room” for word-level fault-induced counter advancements for lower
fault rates (e.g., ≤10−4) without exceeding the row-level counter lifetime.
At 10−3, for ECP ≥3, A<1. At 10−2 there are significant fault-induced counter ad-
vancements, owing to gracefully degraded operation. However, increasing the number of
epochs searched for larger numbers of ECP pointers, especially ECP-6, provides significant
improvements in protection, with only slight increases to A. To achieve an UBER of 10−11
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Figure 13: Counters advanced per write at various error rates. CASTLE explores one epoch
(w=8) except where noted. CASTLEw+ECP is reported for CM with an error bar indicating
PM. Row Encryption is always unity.
As this gracefully degraded mode would only occur very late in the memory lifetime,
these counter advancements would only saturate the counter nominally sooner and minimally
increase encryption energy, while extending the usable life dramatically. If the system is reset
with a new encryption key or the data is moved for another reason (e.g., wear-leveling [40]),
the counter can also be reset. The performance impact is studied in detail in Section 3.4.6.
Counter-mode encryption has a downside that it requires the storage of a counter for
each row. Unfortunately, this overhead cannot be eliminated for counter-mode encryption.
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However, the storage dedicated to the per-word sub-counters, initially proposed by SE-
CRET [38] to reduce energy and improve endurance, could be retargeted to improve fault
tolerance. This storage would be insufficient to add additional ECC, but could add two
additional ECP pointers. This comparison is shown in Figures. 12 and 13 by comparing
CASTLEw with ECPN to CASTLEr with ECPN+2. The results indicate that for lower
fault rates, CASTLEr would provide an advantage in fault tolerance at the cost of increased
energy and reduced endurance. As the fault rate increases, CASTLEw in PM mode is more
fault tolerant while maintaining energy and endurance benefits over CASTLEr.
3.4.2 Coset Size Study
Figure 14 depicts the mean count of SA-W bits as the number of coset codes is swept
from 4 to 128 for a fault incidence rate of 10−2. Similar results were obtained for 10−3 down
to 10−6. The plot represents the mean of 1M cache line writebacks across the SPEC2017
benchmarks. The curve exhibits diminishing returns for a count of cosets beyond 32, with the
knee between 16 and 32 cosets. This aligns well with the amount of encoding bits recovered
under MTC; all compression methods recover at least five bits per word. We conclude that
a coset of 32 codes is ideal for applying the compression-optimized coset approach.
3.4.3 Compressibility Study
Figure 15 depicts the compressibility of the SPEC2017 benchmarks using MTC. Each
benchmark was evaluated for the first 5 · 109 cache lines or until the end of the trace was
reached. Several of the benchmarks exhibit high compression coverage, which is promising
for the application of TOWERs. Under simulation, the number of cache lines was restricted
to a representative sample of 5M cache line writes. Compressibility is relevant because the
ratio of compressible lines is directly proportional to how often cosets can be applied. We
thus expect to see a proportionally smaller improvement over the control case for workloads
which are less compressible.
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Figure 14: SA-W Bits vs. Number of Coset Codes, evaluated over 1M representative write-


















































Experimental Sample, 5M Lines Full Trace
Figure 15: Compressibility of cache lines in the SPEC2017 traces, for the full trace and the
sample under test.
3.4.4 TOWER Multi-Objective Optimization
To evaluate the effectiveness of TOWER, we consider first its impact on energy and
endurance. Figure 16 depicts the change in differential write energy and of RESETs as
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a percentage of the baseline of SECRET for each benchmark, using a fault rate of 10−4.
Each experiment first optimized for SA-W bits, and then optimized for either differential
write energy or RESETs (as a proxy for endurance). Note SECRET achieves an average
46% reduction in write energy compared to row-level encryption, including encrypted data
protected by partition-and-flip approaches such as AEGIS. As expected, we observe that the
improvements follow the compressibility trends of Figure 15, as TOWER only operates on
compressible rows. We also observe that optimizing for RESETS and for differential write
energy produces comparable results for overall differential write energy, likely due to the
higher energy of RESETs versus SETs [17]. We ran identical experiments for different fault
rates (10−2 to 10−6) and numbers of pointers (ECP-1 to ECP-6) and the trends are similar
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RESET count, optimized for energy RESET count, optimized for RESETs
Figure 16: Change in RESETs (endurance) and write energy (lower is better) relative to
SECRET at a fault rate of 10−4.
Using reported and derived energy parameters for PCM at various feature sizes from
180nm down to 28nm [17, 55], we conducted a write energy sensitivity study on our optimized
write energy as feature size scales1. Figure 17 reports CASTLE with TOWERs written
energy reduction normalized to a control without optimization for a fault incidence rate of
10−4, with RESET reduction as the secondary optimization parameter. Generally, the study
indicates that the improvements from TOWERs remains highly correlated to the compression
ratio and that the different devices does not dramatically change the trend. The older feature
1Three devices at 180nm, 90nm, and 32nm were modeled using reported parameters [17, 55]. Results for
45nm and 28nm were reported by scaling the 32nm device [17].
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sizes 180nm and 90nm tend to show slightly lower benefit than the newer feature sizes from
45nm down to 28nm. This is due to a slightly higher ratio of SET energy to RESET energy
at 180nm and 90nm (circa 0.7). This ratio improves for the smaller feature sizes (circa 0.5),


















180nm 90nm 45nm 32nm 28nm
Figure 17: Write energy vs. feature size at a fault rate of 10−4. Values are normalized to the
control case (unprotected, encrypted writeback), with reduction of RESETs as the secondary
optimization parameter.
We then considered the hardware required to realize these improvements. The auxiliary
bits for multi-objective optimization compose an area overhead of 0.039mm2, or <2.5% per
GB in commercial PCM with a density of 0.64GB/mm2 [5]. The coset encoding delay and
power are 1.07ns and 15.8mW, while decoding is 0.35ns and 1.5mW. This is <1% of the
write and read latency and power, respectively, for PCM reported by NVSim [63], <0.1%
of the values reported for Optane DIMMs and is consistent with other results found in the
literature [46, 57].
Of course, the primary goal of TOWER is to reduce the number of SA-W bits. To this
end, Figure 18 demonstrates that the coset approach is effective at reducing SA-Ws when the
data can be compressed. For a SECRET-like encrypted memory system using ECP-3, when
applying TOWERs, highly compressible benchmarks like bwaves, mcf, and lbm achieve an
improvement of several orders of magnitude for higher fault rates. There were comparatively
fewer, if any, SA-W bits for the lower fault incidence rates and higher ECP protection, which
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Figure 18: UBER using TOWERs and ECP-3, using RESETs as a secondary optimization
parameter.
TOWERs effectively masked these faults and in turn reduced the UBER. Moreover, for fault
rates lower than 10−5 all potential faults were eliminated.
3.4.5 Lifetime Study
Figure 19 shows the relative lifetime improvement of various correction schemes compared
to ECC-1 at approximately the same overheads of ECC-1 (and ECP-6). CASTLEr refers to
row-based CASTLE, and CASTLEw refers to word-based CASTLE. On average, ECP-6’s
benefits over unprotected and ECC1 are 70× and 4.4×. With the inclusion of SECRET,
which includes ECP-6 but reduces the RESETs per write, this benefit over ECC1 increases
to 6.4×. In this evaluation we also included an iso-area comparison with AEGIS, which can
correct a guaranteed 11 faults compared to six for ECP-6. As a result, AEGIS provides a
12.4× improvement over ECC1 and a 1.9× improvement over SECRET.
The addition of CASTLEw achieves over 30× lifetime compared to ECC1, a 4.7× im-
provement over SECRET and 2.4× improvement over AEGIS. Further, the lifetime results
highlight the benefits of TOWER: in the best cases with very high compression, adding



























ECP6 SECRET AEGIS TOWER+ECP6 CASTLEr + ECP6 CASTLEw + ECP4 CASTLEr + TOWER+ ECP6 CASTLEr + TOWER + ECP4
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Figure 19: Lifetime (writes until failure) for an 1MB memory with mean cell lifetime of 108
writes, with 0.2 CoV. These results assume perfect wear-leveling. Note that all CASTLE
and TOWER results shown here, like SECRET, include subcounters to minimize writes to
clean words. SECRET bar includes ECP-6.
protected system and ECC-1, respectively. On average across the representative SPEC2017
benchmarks, this improvement for CASTLEw and TOWERS over ECC-1, SECRET, and
AEGIS is 45×, 7.1×, and 3.7×, respectively, providing a 1.5× improvement over CASTLEw
alone.
Figure 20 presents a sensitivity study of the lifetime improvements of CASTLE+TOWER
over increasing coefficient of variation and different area overhead. The height of the orange
bars represent the additional writes the schemes enable before failure, while the line chart
represents improvement over iso-area SECRET (the ratio of the orange bars over the blue
bars). Looking at the figure, increasing the CoV decreases the overall lifetime and the raw
improvements over SECRET alone, while raising the relative improvement over SECRET.
This indicates that while the benefits of both SECRET and our proposed schemes deteriorate
in lifetime as CoV increases, CASTLE and TOWERs deteriorate more slowly than SECRET,
gaining increased relative lifetime as variation increases. At 12% area overhead, the relative
improvement over iso-area SECRET for CASTLEw+TOWER increases from 7.1× to 8.2×
(0.25 CoV) and 9.8× (0.3 CoV). However, for systems with more constrained area overhead
(8% area), this improvement range can be as high as from 8.5× (0.2 CoV) to 13.8× (0.3








































































































SECRET Additional Gain Ratio
Figure 20: Lifetime added to iso-area ECP (stacked bar), as well as the ratio of lifetime to
iso-area ECP (lines) for variable cov and area overhead (SPEC2017). Note that all CASTLE
and TOWER results shown here, like SECRET, include subcounters to minimize writes to
clean words.
3.4.6 Performance Study
The IPC results for counter-mode encryption using the baseline of SECRET are shown
in Figure 21. At 10−4 weak cell rate, using CASTLE is rarely necessary, and thus the IPC
impact is negligible. Adding TOWER to CASTLE at 10−4 weak cell rate reduces the IPC
on average by 0.53%, but provides gains in endurance and energy as discussed in previous
sections.
Moving to the 10−2 weak cell rate, the counters must be advanced more frequently, and as
a result the IPC of CASTLE reduces by 0.42%. Adding TOWERs further reduces the IPC,
for a total of 0.72% on average. The worst-case IPC degradation of CASTLE+TOWER at
a 10−2 rate is less than 3%, and this fault rate only occurs at the end of life, demonstrating
that the performance gracefully degrades as the memory becomes more faulty. One noteable
result is for the benchmark xalancbmk, which is the only benchmark with CASTLE having
a lower IPC than CASTLE+TOWER. This is due to the higher number of advancements

















































Figure 21: IPC relative to a system using SECRET for various configurations of CASTLEw
with ECP-4, with and without TOWER.
We also conducted a sensitivity study across different devices using features sizes from
180nm down to 28nm. These results are shown in Figure 22 for CASTLEw+TOWER at
a fault rate of 10−4 normalized to SECRET. Across the different feature sizes, we see little
change in the overall IPC, indicating that the scale of change in write latencies across feature
sizes is not appreciably different and the variation from an IPC of 1 is largely due to noise in
the simulator. The only benchmark which did not follow this trend was xz. This benchmark
is particularly sensitive to variations in the miss rate of the L1 TLB, and is among the
poorest performers in branch prediction [52]. Over several trials, the L1 miss rate varied by
as much as 10× between the CASTLEw + TOWER and SECRET performance, amplifying
the latency of write operations beyond the relatively small changes associated with the
different protection techniques.
In summary, CASTLE leverages the nature of block cipher encryption to improve relia-
bility for systems that use in-memory encryption in memory with endurance limitations that
manifest as stuck-at values. In particular, CASTLE provides 30×, 4.7×, and 2.4× longer
lifetime than SECDED ECC; SECRET, which uses six ECP pointers; and AEGIS, which
has a correction guarantee of 11 faults, respectively. CASTLE can also be used to reduce
error correction overhead, achieving a similar protection as five ECP pointers with only a
single pointer at moderate fault rates. Furthermore, CASTLE can maintain an UBER of
at least 10−11 with the same error correction as the leading related work, SECRET [38], for
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Figure 22: IPC of CASTLEw+TOWER at 10−4 fault rate relative to SECRET for various
feature sizes.
TOWERs is, to our knowledge, the first scheme providing lightweight compression on
encrypted data. Using the reclaimed bits from compression, TOWERs applies a coset on
the encrypted data to further improve fault tolerance while also improving energy and en-
durance. TOWERs provides an additional lifetime benefit of 1.5× over CASTLE, which
can reach 2.9× improvement for highly compressible benchmarks. Across the SPEC 2017
workloads, TOWERs reduces energy over SECRET by about 14%, which results in a cumu-
lative improvement in energy of 54% over an encrypted baseline, including one protected by
a partition-and-flip fault tolerance technique, such as AEGIS.
In the next chapter, I present my work on a similar approach to fault tolerance and energy
reduction in MACE WINDU. These techniques are specifically tuned to PCM using AES-
XTS encryption, and serve as an illustrative example of how lifetime energy consumption
can be assessed and analyzed to guide memory system design.
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4.0 MACE WINDU
“Memory AES-XTS Cosets with Energy-efficiency” (MACE) was designed to extend the
lifetime of PCM with in-memory encryption using cosets to generate alternate candidates for
writebacks. Using a similar approach to that of TOWERs, MACE can mask faults associ-
ated with stuck bits, and opportunistically reduce write energy as a secondary optimization
parameter. As with CASTLE & TOWERs, MACE is complementary with existing error
correction techniques, and provides opportunities to finely tune the tradeoff of cosets and
error correction to meet the needs of the system at hand. In support of MACE, I present
“Word-based, Interleaved, Nonessential-bit Decomposition Utility” (WINDU) which lever-
ages lightweight compression in order to store MACE auxiliary bits in reclaimed space.
Portions of this chapter reproduce text and images with permission from my publication
“Toward Secure, Reliable, and Energy Efficient Phase-change Main Memory with MACE” [8]
©2019 IEEE.
4.1 MACE Encoding
The leading fault tolerance approaches for in-memory encryption operate in concert with
ECP. SECRET [38] adds additional auxiliary capacity to store ECP pointers directly while
counter advance (used for CASTLE) uses the AES block-cipher itself to generate cosets on
demand when the correction capability is exceeded [7]. However, this approach relies on the
fact that the counter used in AES-GCM and CASTLE will produce a new random value
every time; for unbiased data, a random coset will be more effective than a fixed or biased
one [47, 34]. In contrast, AES-XTS will generate its OTP from an initial value based on
the address, but that value is invariant for the block being encrypted. Thus, the leading
approach in CASTLE is not a practical approach for mitigating endurance faults. Thus we
fall back to the prior approach of appending auxiliary space to the end of each memory row
for ECP as shown in Figure 23.
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AES-XTS AES-XTS AES-XTS AES-XTS
Ciphertext ECP (a)
Coset Enc. Coset Enc. Coset Enc. Coset Enc.
(b)ECPCoset Aux.MACE
Figure 23: AES-XTS encryption with (a) ECP fault tolerance and (b) MACE fault tolerance.
MACE leverages the idea that random cosets can be effective to optimize codewords for
a particular criterion [47, 34] including minimizing SA-W data [64, 33]. MACE, shown in
Figure 23(b), takes the ciphertext and conducts coset encoding for reliability using a set
of randomly generated coset candidates [47]. The binary ID of the coset candidate that
minimizes SA-Ws is stored as auxiliary information. To retain a near-iso-area overhead,
coset auxiliary bits (dark purple) may replace bits that would have been allocated for ECP
(light purple). Any remaining SA-W bits after coset encoding are corrected by the remaining
ECP. Thus an acceptable writeback candidate will reduce the number of SA-Ws such that
pointer fault tolerance can handle them.
We see from Figure 23 that cosets are applied locally to blocks smaller than the row,
but pointers are global for the row. To maximize fault tolerance it is desirable to locally
minimize SA-Ws in each word. As discussed in Section 2.3, in-memory encryption defeats
locality-based techniques to reduce bit changes. However, early in the memory lifetime, there
is low pressure on fault tolerance. Thus, MACE can apply a secondary optimization metric
such as flip minimization, improving energy and endurance.
MACE uses the same approach as TOWERs to apply a multi-objective cost function
for coset selection. Assuming some method of distinguishing SA-R and SA-W faults, there
may be several candidates which minimize errors, which can then be optimized according to
a secondary metric such as energy reduction. As with CASTLE and SECRET, we assume
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that writes are only committed for dirty words. However, if all the available candidates fail
to reduce the number of faults to the correction capacity, the entire row can be re-encoded
by the best coset to potentially free another pointer for use in the word being written. This
progressively more conservative approach allows Algorithm 1 to opportunistically reduce the
secondary cost while avoiding taking on more SA-W bits than the correction scheme can
support.
Coset effectiveness improves as the codes are applied to smaller sub-row blocks or the
number of codes per block increases, both at the expense of increased auxiliary bits. TOW-
ERs and previous work have explored compression to create space for auxiliary bits within
the data block to mitigate this overhead [46, 48]. AES-XTS’s block-cipher encryption of
data makes efficiently storing auxiliary data in the space reclaimed by compression appar-
ently intractable; for counter-mode-based encryption the bits reclaimed by compression can
simply be overwritten because the encryption is applied via XOR with the OTP. Unfortu-
nately, AES-XTS introduces a block cipher encryption between the OTP steps, diffusing
information from every bit of the input to every bit of the output. Rather than simply pay
the penalty of reserving additional capacity for coset ID encoding, I developed WINDU.
4.2 WINDU Architecture
Applying lightweight compression to reclaim space for storing auxiliary bits representing
the coset encoding is non-trivial for AES-XTS. In MACE, cosets are applied after encryp-
tion due to the simple XOR function required to generate each write candidate. Lightweight
compression must be completed prior to encryption as it leverages similarity in the data,
which is destroyed by the encryption process. Thus, if the coset can be applied prior to
encryption, each the coset candidate can be generated from the compressed word using the
XOR function and concatenated with the auxiliary value, which is stored in the reclaimed bits.
While this is practical for a OTP, it is impractical for AES-XTS, because each candidate
must be encrypted separately with an expensive block-cipher operation.
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Thus, to leverage reclaimed space from lightweight compression for storing MACE aux-
iliary information, we propose the Word-based Interleaved Nonessential-bit Decomposition
Utility (WINDU), shown in Figure 24. MTC lightweight compression [48] is applied to each
word in the memory row to recover 5-7 bits per word, shown as white boxes. As with TOW-
ERs, MTC techniques are selected for their simplicity and compression coverage; matching
bits in the leading byte of each word are readily identified and apply to a large proportion
of data. The compressed data is then repacked toward the MSB, to absorb the reclaimed
space and clustering the unused bits at the end of the row. AES-XTS then proceeds as in
Figure 23 with the exception of the tail of the blue data and the reclaimed space. After the
MACE cosets are determined for the encrypted data, their auxiliary encoding is added to
the reclaimed space of the last block, encrypted, and then passed through the coset function









Figure 24: Applying WINDU to a cache line before writeback. Each word in the line is
compressed, the compressed data is packed into the MSBs of the cache line, and then each
word in the resultant line is assessed to determine the best coset to apply.
This approach requires only log2(n) + 2 bits to encode the coset codeword, where n
is the number of coset candidates and the remaining two bits indicate one of three MTC
compression states for the row (“01,” “10,” or “11”) or that the row is uncompressed (“00”).
For 512-bit rows, 64-bit words, and 32-bits cosets per word, the encoding bits will only
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consume 35 of the 40 bits reclaimed by compression. If the seven external auxiliary bits
are protected with ECP-1, this is adds four additional bits (three address bits plus one
replacement bit), requiring a total of 11 bits, which is 2.2% of the total row as overhead. Thus,
MACE WINDU essentially repurposes the bits of one pointer for this encoding. Compared to
MACE, this a significant area advantage, as 32 cosets would require reclaiming four pointers.
We can improve on this overhead by storing the compression bits in the reclaimed space.
We can also leverage parallel AES units and multi-stage coset encoding to reduce this further.
For a 512-bit row with 128-bit encryption blocks, the system needs at least four AES units.
Using these units in parallel, we can create four candidate parents (first stage) by encoding
pre-encryption candidate with a unique two-bit value in the remaining reclaimed bits. This
will generate four uniquely encrypted words. Using eight vector MACE post-encryption
cosets on each parent candidate (second stage) generates 32 unique candidates, while needing
to store only the single three-bit ID of the coset applied. With eight parallel AES units,
the reclaimed bits are entirely filled and only two external bits are needed. These remaining
≤3 bits can be protected through triple-modular redundancy, requiring a total of 9 (or 6)
auxiliary bits (1.8% or 1.2% overhead) and reclaiming only 1 pointer.
There are performance ramifications for not enforcing word alignment in memory. For
all but the most significant word (MSW), the compressed data must be packed such that it
will cross a word boundary. Since all the encoding for the MSWs is stored in the LSW, every
access requires decoding and decrypting the final word. In the worst case, we need to access
three words for every transaction: the words on either side of the boundary the compressed
data crosses, and the final word to retrieve the encoding information. For memory systems
which employ critical word first and early restart, applying WINDU will incur this additional
access penalty. For a 512-bit row size using 64-bit words, assuming that the word accesses
are evenly distributed, we expect that transactions on the first and last word will require
accessing two words and for the remaining words accessing three words, with an expected




= 2.75 word accesses per word transaction. Another potential performance
issue is the latency associated with serializing the encryption of the final word. This roughly
doubles the latency associated with encryption. However, WINDU provides comparable
coset protection while reclaiming three fewer pointers than MACE alone.
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4.3 LARS Sustainability Analysis
Prior work in GreenChip [65] developed the indifference analysis shown in Equation 3
where Mi is the embodied (i.e., manufacturing) energy and Pi is the operational power of
system i. It is sufficiently flexible for different holistic sustainability evaluations, when system
reliability is constant between design choices. However, when evaluating an approach like
MACE, different configurations will have an impact on lifetime due to memory wearout—
different points in the tradespace of using auxiliary space for ECP versus MACE will impact
dynamic energy and cumulative energy consumed by the system. If a system has lower
use-phase energy and lower embodied energy, but it must be replaced every month, this
replacement embodied energy should be taken into account when comparing it with another
system. Thus, we proposed an extension to indifference theory called “Lifetime Amortized
















The fundamental difference between LARS indifference analysis and prior sustainability
indifference analysis [65] is the inclusion of amortized embodied energy of replacements
reflected in Eq. 5. In Eq. 3, the indifference point reports the time it takes for a system with
lower operational power to save the equivalent energy of the larger embodied energy from
more complicated manufacturing. However, when the mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) interval
lapses for one system prior to the indifference time, traditional analysis is less meaningful.
With LARS indifference analysis, we consider replacement embodied energy as a cost per
time shown in Eq. 4, in a similar fashion to operational power. Ai is the embodied energy,
Mi, divided by the lifetime, Li, for a system i. Li can be determined as the ratio of writes
before failure WBFi to the write velocity (writes per second) Wi of system i. The LARS
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comparison assumes two systems under comparison operate until failure, are replaced with
the same system, and the cycle continues indefinitely. Essentially, the LARS indifference
time now considers replacement cycle along with embodied energy, operational energy, and
usage scenario.
4.4 Experimental Setup for MACE WINDU
To evaluate MACE and MACE WINDU, we created a modified Pintool [50] to monitor
all memory writes (cache writebacks) encountered at the lowest-level, unified cache. The
provided cache monitoring instrumentation was adapted to extract the address and data of
512-bit cache lines as they were evicted. This instrumentation was attached to execution
runs of a selection of the SPEC2017 benchmarks. The benchmarks listed in Table 1 were
selected for their representative coverage of the rest of the suite [52] and augmented with
any benchmarks which exhibited a relatively high percentage of memory operations. All
benchmarks were compiled using the SPEC base and speed metrics to incur higher memory
use, and executed with reference workloads.
As with CASTLE & TOWERs, to evaluate reliability, fault maps were generated to
match incidence rates of 10−5...10−2, representing high to extreme cases of cell failure. Each
of the fault maps specifies permanently failed bits as stuck-at ‘0’ or stuck-at ‘1,’ identified by
their bitwise row and column position in a 2GB memory. A Bayesian distribution was used
to approximate the spatial correlation of faults [25]. Under simulation, the fault maps were
used to generate fault vectors for each cache line writeback based on the trace address of
the benchmark under test. For lifetimes, cells were assumed to have an average of 108 write
cycles before failure following a standard distribution [66, 32, 58] with a pessimistic coefficient
of variation (CoV) of 0.25 [32, 58] and perfectly uniform wear-leveling [58] consistent with
many proposals in the literature [59, 60, 58]. Experimental results represent an average over
10 experiments.
To evaluate the overall performance impact of MACE WINDU in the context of AES-XTS
protection, we used the SNIPER full-system simulator [62] to monitor performance for each
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of the selected benchmarks. The simulation system parameters are shown identical to those
used in the evaluation of CASTLE & TOWERs as shown in Table 2. For this experiment, it
was assumed that a parallel hardware implementation of AES-XTS was used, and that the
latency of AES-XTS encryption is double that of an AES block-cipher. To model the latency
of coset encoding/decoding, we used parameters from a hardware simulation presented in
previous work on coset encoding [46].
4.5 Results
Based on the experimental setup described in Section 4.4, we conducted detailed evalu-
ations of MACE and MACE WINDU with various configurations of external auxiliary bits
and ECP to understand the impact of our contributions.
4.5.1 Compressibility and Coset Cardinality
MACE WINDU can only be applied when all the words within each cache line are
compressible. Thus, we explored compression coverage, measured as the ratio of compressible
cache lines written to all cache lines written, for a modified version of MTC [48]. As with
our evaluation for the CASTLE & TOWERs work, we found that most workloads exhibited
high compression coverage, especially after an initial warm-up period. This study is identical
to that presented in Section 3.4.2, shown in Figure 14.
To guide the selection of the cardinality of the coset, denoted with m bits to generate 2m
candidates, we studied m ∈ {2, 3, ..., 7}. The coset included 2m − 1 pseudo random vectors
and the identity vector. Using a fault incidence rate of 10−2, A representative subset of 1M
cache line writebacks was evaluated for each benchmark, and arithmetic mean of the total
SA-W bits encountered was recorded. The results indicate a diminishing return for more
than 32 cosets (m = 5), with the knee of the curve between 16 and 32 cosets. Given the
amount of bits reclaimed per word by MTC of five bits, we conclude that 32 cosets is the
ideal cardinality in terms of efficacy of MACE and efficient use of reclaimed bit area for
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WINDU, and assume this number of cosets for the remaining experiments. This study is
identical to that presented in Section 3.4.3, shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 25: Mean lifetime writes for various combinations of ECP-N, MACE, and WINDU
applied to the benchmarks under test. Assuming iso-area configuration, we compare ECP-6,
MACE alone with 8, 16, and 32 cosets, and WINDU with either ECP-5 or MACE. For
the latter, WINDU is applied to compressible lines, and either ECP-6 or ECP-2 + MACE
otherwise.
To evaluate the effect of MACE on PCM lifetime, iso-area configurations of MACE and
MACE WINDU were compared to the baseline of ECP-6 [38] when protecting a simulated
memory system to failure. Each experiment continually issued writes until the simulation
recorded four cache line writebacks with unrecoverable bit errors [59].
Figure 25 reports the results. MACE with eight cosets and three pointers (MACE 8,3)1,2
performs poorly, but increasing to 16 cosets while losing one pointer (MACE 16,2)1,2 slightly
outperforms ECP. With evenly distributed faults, the probability of failure is similar for both
approaches. However, the spatial correlation of faults sees more instances where there are
more faults than ECP can correct, and the additional cosets outperform the ECP.
1Coset auxiliary bits are protected with a single ECP-style pointer.
2An uncorrected stuck-at failure in the coset bits does not result in a failure, but reduces the number of
coset candidates by half, decreasing effectiveness.
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Increasing to 32 cosets is the best MACE-only configuration as it retains the same number
of pointers (MACE 32,2)2. Thus, from here on, MACE assumes MACE 32,2 unless specified.
MACE WINDU, which reverts to ECP-6 when no compression is possible improves over
MACE on average, but this improvement is not consistent for all applications. However,
when MACE WINDU reverts to MACE without compression, there is improvement for all
compressible benchmarks. MACE WINDU with ECP or MACE 32,2 provides an average
lifetime improvement of 2× and 2.6× over ECP, respectively and 40% and 81%, respectively
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Figure 26: Improvement in differential write energy and endurance (RESETs) relative to
ECP. MACE 32,2, invariant of compressibility, summarized with a single entry. Incidence
fault rate of 10−2.
4.5.3 Energy and Endurance
To evaluate the impact of the MACE approach we conducted an energy and endurance
evaluation, including the bit changes associated with writing auxiliary bits. Figure 26 depicts
the improvement in differential write energy and count of RESET operations, expressed as
a percentage, normalized to ECP only (control) for each benchmark using MACE WINDU,
assuming a fault incidence rate of 10−2. A similar calculation was done for MACE. As
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MACE is invariant to compression, the energy and endurance calculation is similar for each
benchmark and is summarized in the single MACE entry in the figure.
As expected, MACE WINDU improvement tracks workload compressibility. Further-
more, there is minimal distinction between optimizing energy or endurance, as both benefit
from minimizing bit changes. MACE improves over MACE WINDU in cases where the
compressibility is moderate to low but has a disadvantage in terms of storage overhead. We
explore this further in Section 4.5.5.
4.5.4 Performance Impact
To evaluate the impact of MACE WINDU on performance, IPC was measured for AES-
XTS+ECP versus AES-XTS+MACE WINDU. Note, AES-XTS+MACE is similar to AES-
XTS+ECP because MACE does not significantly impact the read critical path delay like
MACE WINDU. Figure 27 shows the results, normalized to AES-XTS+ECP, using a fault
incidence rate of 10−2. As expected, we can see a general trend that more compressible
workloads tend to have reduced IPC, owing to the additional overhead for applying and
evaluating coset candidates. This pattern is perturbed somewhat by the proportion of mem-
ory instructions in each workload. However, the performance penalty never exceeds the
energy saved (Figure 26), so the additional runtime for any given task will still save overall
memory energy.
4.5.5 LARS Whole-lifetime Energy Analysis
Based on the results of the lifetime and energy studies, a sustainability analysis was
conducted using a modified version of the GreenChip [65] tool to include LARS indifference
analysis. The observed lifetimes for each of the configurations were used alongside esti-
mates of both embodied and operational energy consumption to evaluate the lifetime energy
footprint.
Figures 28a, 28b, 28c show indifference point plots, calculated using Eq. 3 for (a) ECP-
6 versus MACE 32,6 (32 cosets, 6 pointers), (b) MACE WINDU (MW), which reverts to













































(c) MW vs. MACE
(4TB)
Figure 28: Indifference points (tI) for the traditional GreenChip tool for ECP-6, MACE
32,6, and MACE WINDU (MACE 32,2) for 1TB PCM, except where noted.
(c) the same MW versus MACE comparison for a 4TB memory. Note, the MACE configura-
tion consistently has a larger area overhead, i.e., embodied energy, with a lower operational
energy. The figures highlight a range of usage scenarios for blade servers, from from 95% up-
time and low utilization (underloaded cloud) to similar uptime and high utilization (heavily






(c) MW vs. MACE
(4TB)
Figure 29: LARS indifference points (tI) for the GreenChip tool for ECP-6, MACE 32,6,
and MACE WINDU (MACE 32,2) for 1TB PCM, except where noted.
Figure 28a indicates that MACE requires ≥29 years to recoup the additional embodied
costs from the area overheads. Similarly, Figures 28b and 28c show MACE requires 2.1-7.3
years and 4.3-17.5 years, reflecting highest to lowest activity, for 1TB and 4TB memories,
respectively.
Recalling from Section 4.5.5, that Eq. 3 does not accurately reflect indifference when
reliability and replacement cycle are a function of the system comparison. Figure 29 shows
the same comparison as Figure 28, except using Eq. 5 which takes into account amortized
embodied energy from replacements (Eq. 4). The biggest change is in Figure 29a, where in-
difference time of 29 years drops to <5 months, and low utilization approaching ∞ becomes
<18 months. The MW versus MACE comparisons show similar adjustments where Fig-
ures 29b and 29c report 1.3-4.5 years and 2.0-7.1 years, respectively, reflecting approximately
60% and 2× lower indifference time for 1TB and 4TB memories, respectively. Clearly, from
Figure 29, MACE is the considerably more sustainable choice than ECP, but the choice of
MACE WINDU versus MACE is more dependent on system configurations. MACE WINDU
is more sustainable for moderate to large memories with MACE being more attractive for
very large memories. This suggests a tradeoff between total capacity, effective capacity (total
capacity less correction overhead), and activity ratio of a server.
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Together, MACE and WINDU demonstrate improved lifetime and reduced energy con-
sumption when applied to encrypted non-volatile memories. MACE readily generates write-
back candidates with fewer SA-W faults, and opportunistically reduces dynamic energy by
15% on average. The addition of WINDU allows the technique to be applied within the
existing error correction overhead, to achieve upwards of 2.6× improvement in lifetime over
ECP-6. The LARS indifference analysis extends the indifference analysis of GreenChip to in-
clude the memory lifetime. This permits a holistic study of the tradespace between activity,
capacity, and correction overhead in the context of non-volatile memories.
In the final chapter, I present a summary of my contributions to date and how my body
of work supports the goals of this thesis, alongside directions for future study.
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5.0 Conclusion & Future Work
CASTLE and TOWERs [7], of which TOWERs and the simulation/evaluation work are
my primary contributions, can achieve an average lifetime improvement of over 45× com-
pared to SECDED ECC, 7.1× compared to SECRET, and 3.6× compared to the leading
partition-and-flip fault-tolerance approach (AEGIS) for the same area overhead. CASTLE
leverages the counter-mode encryption process to improve reliability in the presence of en-
durance faults. TOWERs for CASTLE improve reliability as well as energy for encrypted
data through a novel application of compression and encoding. CASTLE and TOWERs
are compatible with error-correction codes (ECC) and error correction pointers (ECP), the
standard for mitigating endurance faults in PCM. Together, they represent an immediately
applicable technique which meets the goals of this thesis using the state-of-the-art PCM
technology.
I designed MACE and WINDU [8] for PCM in a high-capacity cloud computing context,
for which AES-XTS encryption has been established as the de facto standard for data confi-
dentiality. In this setting, MACE improves the lifetime and dynamic energy of PCM by up
to 2.6× and 15%, respectively. The WINDU architecture leverages lightweight in-memory
compression akin to TOWERs to reduce the auxliary overhead of the MACE technique.
The addition of WINDU allows the technique to be applied within the existing error cor-
rection overhead—I have shown that MACE WINDU can achieve better fault tolerance and
endurance than ECP alone for the same area overhead. For workloads that exhibit low com-
pressibility, MACE makes more effective use of overhead than ECP, and secures an energy
benefit. To more thoroughly explore the cradle-to-grave energy consumption of a system,
which is especially salient to system designers of cloud computing servers, I co-designed
the LARS indifference analysis approach. This holistic view of lifetime energy consumption
accounts for replacement of failed memory devices informs system design and memory selec-
tion. The LARS indifference analysis demonstrates that the endurance and energy benefits
of MACE and MACE-WINDU are realized on a relatively short time scale, and illustrates
situations where server utilization and total storage capacity favor one or the other.
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In future work, all of the above techniques could be evaluated in concert with other fault
tolerance techniques. The fault tolerance benefit of my work is agnostic to the secondary fault
tolerance approach with which they are combined. Although this study uses ECP, which
was inherited by building upon SECRET, in principle, CASTLE and TOWERs or MACE
can be combined with a partition-and-flip fault tolerance approach like AEGIS, which could
increase the lifetime further. Similar studies of iso-area lifetime and energy improvements
could compare any such fault mitigation scheme.
Using AEGIS with SECRET, and by extension word level CASTLE and TOWERs,
creates an undesirable side effect. While ECP correction can be localized to the encrypted
word, AEGIS requires bit changes throughout the row, disrupting SECRET’s benefit of
only writing dirty words. New faults often require AEGIS to restore flipped groups of the
current partition and flip bits of a new partition, impacting SECRET’s energy savings.
TOWERs could partially mitigate this overhead, by extending the coset selection heuristic
(Algorithm 1) beyond the word to the entire row. We hope to study this in future work. Of
course, the row version of CASTLE and TOWER can use AEGIS without these concerns.
Moreover, iso-area word-level CASTLE and TOWERs (ECP-6) improves lifetime by 3.7×
with a 54% energy reduction compared to AEGIS, showing the efficacy of the CASTLE and
TOWERs approach.
With continued process development and scaling, the access time for PCM is expected
to improve. Beyond process maturation, novel cell designs, material selection, and alternate
access circuits (e.g., optically-switched PCM films [67], carbon nanotube access [14]) are
promising approaches to reducing the relatively high write latency of PCM cells. In the
interim, my work could incorporate additional techniques to improve the access latency at
the memory controller and cache level. My work to date assumes the the memory controller
and how it accesses the underlying PCM is opaque to the cache and other upstream units.
With specific knowledge of what data are dirty, the load on the memory transaction queues,
and the parameters of the encryption process, there is an opportunity to improve the overall
average memory access time of a PCM main memory unit. This is a departure from the
DRAM-compatible designs in the literature to date, but such work is a necessary step to
establishing PCM as a standalone main memory.
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The continued demand for denser, faster, and more energy-efficient memory systems is
driving research of emerging memory technologies to overcome the limitations of DRAM.
Already, PCM is emerging as a potential unified memory which can act as both main mem-
ory and storage-class memory. However, its outstanding challenges in reliability, energy
efficiency, and security must be resolved before PCM is a viable candidate. In my body of
work, I have drawn attention these three inseparable design concerns as the most pressing
challenges to overcome. This thesis presents two approaches which address these concerns si-
multaneously, prepared for the context of standardized in-memory encryption and evaluated
under representative modern workloads. Together, these techniques advance the state-of-
the-art and represent a step toward the adoption of PCM as a main memory technology.
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